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Abstract:
In most countries large business enterprises today are organized as corporations. The
corporation with its key attributes of independent personality, limited liability and free
tradeability of shares has played a key role in most developed market economies since the
19th century and has made major inroads in emerging markets. We suggest that the
resilience of the corporate form is a function of the adaptability of the legal framework to
a changing environment. We analyze a country’s capacity to innovate using the rate of
statutory legal change, the flexibility of corporate law, and institutional change as
indicators. Our findings suggest that origin countries are more innovative than transplant
countries.
JEL Classification: G3, K2, N2, P5

Forthcoming in: Journal of Comparative Economics (2003).
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1. Introduction

Corporate law and corporate governance are used in recent literature to explain
differences in the performance of financial markets and firms. The objective of this
research is to identify variables that account for differences in performance and to rectify
deficiencies in corporate law and financial market development by changing these
variables. Attempts to identify best legal practice and to develop legal standards that may
be transplanted are endorsed by multinational institutions, such as the IMF and the World
Bank (Pistor, 2002). This strategy receives empirical support in studies showing that the
level of minority shareholder protection in laws on the books does indeed have a
statistically significant impact on the development of financial markets as measured by
standard indicators, such as market capitalization, liquidity, and the ownership
concentration of firms (La Porta et al., 1997 and La Porta et al., 1998). These studies find
that countries belonging to the common law family have better minority shareholder
protection on average than countries belonging to the German, French or even the
Scandinavian civil law family. They also show that common law countries have better
developed financial markets than do civil law countries.
Implicit in this analysis is a causal relation that runs from legal origin to the quality of
law to financial outcome. However, a brief review of the history of corporate law in the
mother country of the common law, England, shows that only a few of the indicators that
account for the high level of minority shareholder protection in common law countries as
measured in these studies were present at the time the first corporate statutes were
enacted as Table 1 indicates.
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Table 1: Minority Shareholder Protection in English Law
Date of Enactment
Proxy by mail
1948

Comment
Prior to 1948, shareholders could vote by proxy only if
this had been stipulated in the articles of incorporation;
no mention is made of proxy by mail.

Cumulative voting

(-)

(-)

No blocking of shares

(-)

(-)

Shareholder suit

1844

Direct suit implied in 1844; derivative action recognized
only in 1975.

Preemptive rights

1980

Adopted in response to EU harmonization requirements.

Shareholders representing not
1909
The 1862 law required 20 percent.
more than 10 percent of total
The threshold was lowered to 5 percent in 1948.
stock can call extraordinary
shareholder meeting
Source: English Companies Acts 1844 to present.
Note: (-) denotes that the relevant provision does not exist in the statutory corporate law.

This observation raises the issues of why some countries have developed these
protective mechanisms while others have not and whether a set of static indicators can
serve as a proxy for the quality of law. In this paper, we propose an alternative approach
to assessing the quality of corporate law, namely, the capacity of a legal system to
innovate. The more innovative and adaptable a legal system is, the more likely it is able
to respond to a changing environment and thereby give firms the possibility to explore
new opportunities while ensuring a minimum level of investor protection.
We use data on the evolution of corporate law in ten jurisdictions to explore this
proposition. Each of the major legal families, namely, the common law family and civil
law families of France and Germany, are represented. For each family, we include origin
countries, i.e. countries that developed their formal legal systems largely internally or
with only limited borrowing, as well as transplant countries, i.e., those that received their
formal legal order from foreign sources. The four origin countries are France, Germany,
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England, and the United States.2 The six transplant countries are Spain, Chile and
Colombia belonging to French civil law, Japan belonging to the German civil law, and
Israel and Malaysia belonging to the common law families.
We find substantial differences in the capacity of legal systems to innovate along
three dimensions, namely, the rate of statutory legal change, the flexibility of corporate
law, i.e., enabling vs. mandatory, and the development of new enforcement mechanisms.
First, our findings suggest that the rate of statutory legal change is substantially higher in
origin countries than in transplants. Although common law countries have had a
somewhat higher rate of change than civil law countries among the four origin countries,
the difference between origins and transplants within each legal family is greater than the
differences across legal families. Second, countries with a highly mandatory statutory law
exhibit less innovation than countries with a more enabling statutory law. Third, legal
institutional innovation, in particular, the creation of new enforcement agents such as
regulators, has been higher in countries with a more enabling corporate law than in those
with a highly mandatory law.
Our evidence is drawn from statutory corporate law provisions on issues related to
corporate finance. In parallel work, we investigate corporate law more broadly and
include the governance structure of the firm as well as the rules governing entry and exist
(Pistor et al., 2002). However, it is in corporate finance law where we find both the
greatest difference across jurisdictions and the greatest rate of innovation over time.
In section two. of this paper we explain the meaning of legal innovation and develop
a set of propositions to assess the innovative capacity of different legal systems. In
2

Whether the U.S. is a transplant or origin country may be disputed. The U.S. received the common law
system by way of transplantation from England. However, since the late 18th century, the legal evolution in
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section threewe present the evidence we find in the ten countries included in the analysis.
Section four concludes.

2. Legal Innovation and Propositions.

Our major proposition is that the capacity of legal systems to innovate is more
important than the level of protection a legal system may afford to particular stakeholders
at any point in time. Minimum protections may be taken as a first indicator to assess the
quality of legal systems. However, such protections may soon be out of date, as changes
in the environment or the capacity of economic agents to circumvent established rules
and to develop new forms of arbitrage will render previously effective protective
mechanisms ineffective. This is true especially in areas such as corporate law and
financial market regulation because socioeconomic and technological change is rapid and
challenges the legal system persistently. The recent wave of financial accounting frauds
in the U.S., a legal system that has been hailed as the most advanced system with regard
to financial market regulation, Coffee (2002b) and Rock (2002), illustrate that innovative
capacity is a continuous challenge.
Innovative capacity does not specify the type of legal protections different legal
systems should adopt or the institutions they should establish. In fact, innovative capacity
refers to a given system’s ability to respond to the challenges it faces, which may well
differ from those faced by a neighboring system. Therefore, we are not interested in a set
of best practice indicators but, in legal change that responds to country or system specific
problems. Moreover, we do not limit legal change to changes in the law on the books,
the U.S. has been sufficiently idiosyncratic (Horwitz, 1977)to justify its classification as an origin country.
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although data availability implies that this is the least difficult case to establish; rather,
we include indicators for the flexibility of corporate law and institutional change
respectively.
Hayek (1973) emphasizes the importance of legal evolution and change and points
out that judge made law is evolutionary by nature. Statutory law enacted by legislatures
may be swifter at times and may serve to correct judge-made law, but statutory law may
also be used to restrict innovation and to infringe on individual liberties. Several authors
argue that the common law is efficient, because the process of lawmaking by judges on a
case by case basis lends itself to efficient rule selection (Priest, 1977 and Rubin, 1977).
However, a potential selection bias affects litigation as Bailey and Rubin (1994) argue.
Finally, a comparative legal analysis emphasizes the differences between code and case
law in bringing about legal change (Merryman, 1985, Merryman, 1996 and Zweigert and
Kötz, 1998). Building on this literature, Beck et al. (2002) use case law, defined as a
dummy variable that indicates whether judicial decisions are a source of law, in addition
to requirements that statutory law rather than principles of equity are a basis for court
rulings as proxies for the adaptability of legal systems. Our approach differs in several
respects. The focus of our analysis is on the law governing the corporate enterprise.
Corporate law has been codified in all major jurisdictions, including the common law
families, since the early 19th century. Therefore, we treat statutory law as an important
source of information for the innovative capacity of legal systems. In particular, we use
the rate of statutory legal change since the first enactment of a formal corporate law as a
proxy for legal innovation.
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Given the importance of statutory corporate law in all jurisdictions, the simple
distinction between case law and statutory law is unlikely to capture major differences
across legal families. Therefore, we classify corporate laws on the continuum from
mandatory to enabling corporate law following Coffee (1989) and Gordon (1989).
Mandatory law means that private agents may not opt out of the allocation of control
rights prescribed in the statutory law. By contrast, an enabling law makes most of the
statutory provisions optional and allows parties to reallocate control rights. The
classification of a corporate law as enabling or mandatory has important implications for
the relevance of judge-made law. When law is mandatory, judges may be called upon to
enforce these rules but they have comparatively little lawmaking functions because the
mandatory nature of the law implies that these functions are reserved for the legislature.
When law is enabling or optional, judges play an important role in determining the
boundaries of the permissible reallocation of control rights and in settling disputes among
private actors with different claims to control rights.
This classification allows us to distinguish between legal systems that belong to the
same legal family. In particular, we show that there are important differences within the
common law family in the mandatory vs. enabling dimension. The law in Delaware,
which is the leading jurisdiction for corporate law within the U.S., represents a highly
enabling corporate law. However, England, as well as Malaysia and Israel are located
somewhere in the middle of a continuum from mandatory to enabling law. The
classification also leads us to reject the proposition by Beck et al. (2002) that Germany
falls within the case law category. In many areas of the law e.g., contracts and torts,
judges in Germany carry out important lawmaking functions, but this is not the case for
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the law governing the publicly traded corporation (Aktienrecht). German corporate law is
highly mandatory3 so that case law is virtually absent. Indeed, corporate law textbooks
suggest that, because of the scarcity of case law in this area, it is sufficient to read the
provisions of the statute (Kübler, 1994).4
Our third indicator of innovative capacity is legal institutional change. The
development of stock markets has been accompanied by the emergence of new
lawmaking and law enforcement institutions in the form of regulators, i.e., stock
exchanges and state regulators such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in
the U.S. and the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in the UK (Coffee, 2002a). Recent
work attributes the emergence of financial market regulators to the failure of courts to
enforce the law effectively enough to deter stock and corporate fraud. Glaeser and
Shleifer (2003) argue that this failure in the U.S. in the early 20th century is due to the
fact that the judiciary was captured by powerful industry groups, which necessitated the
creation of a new independent state agent. Pistor and Xu (2003) suggest that, even if
courts are impartial, the design of courts as neutral arbiters implies that courts can
enforce the law only reactively, i.e., after the victim or a state agent have brought action.
This limits their capacity to prevent harmful actions from taking place. By contrast,
regulators are designed to initiate law enforcement independently, which places them in a
better position to prevent harmful actions from occurring. Tentative support for the latter
proposition is found in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002), who suggest that

3

According to para. 23 V Aktiengesetz (Law on Joint Stock Companies) all provisions of the law are
mandatory, unless explicitly stated otherwise in the law.
4
The situation is quite different for closely held corporations (GmbH), for which courts play a very active
role. The reason for the lack of case law governing the Aktiengesellschaft (AG) is widely attributed to the
lack of procedural rules that would allow shareholders to take judicial recourse.
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criminal sanctions administered by courts are less important than the existence of a
financial market regulatory or supervisor for the development of securities markets.
These three indicators of innovative capacity are not independent of each other. A
highly mandatory corporate law limits the ability of private actors to reallocate rights and
also limits the scope of judge-made law. The lack of private innovation and judge-made
law may also affect adversely the rate of statutory legal change. This may be somewhat
counterintuitive because statutory legal change can serve to implement radical legal
change almost immediately. However, to the extent that statutory law limits the ability of
private actors to experiment with new legal forms and restricts the courts’ ability to
review these experiments, it limits the source of legal innovation to the legislature.
Kaplow (1997) argues that legislatures can collect relevant information that would allow
them to assess the demand for legal change. From this perspective, limiting the source of
innovation to the legislature may not impede innovation. However, litigation may be
superior to survey work in revealing critical information that may prompt a reversal in
case law or an intervention by the legislature.
Conversely, a highly enabling law that gives private actors substantial discretion in
allocating and reallocating control rights among themselves requires an effective neutral
arbiter to resolve disputes among competing claims. The more innovations by private
actors, the more difficult it is for courts to keep up with the pace of change and the more
likely it is that legal systems will suffer from deterrence failure (Xu and Pistor, 2002).
Therefore, highly enabling laws governing the corporate enterprise may result in market
collapse, unless the legal system has sufficient capacity to create new institutions to make
up for the deficiencies in law enforcement. Put differently, a highly enabling law
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provides a fertile ground for legal innovation. Unless a legal system proves capable of
responding to the new challenges arising from legal innovation, this strategy may be selfdefeating. The following propositions are derived from the above analysis. First, the
more mandatory is a corporate law, the less legal innovation will take place. Second, the
more enabling is a corporate law, the more legal innovation will take place. Third, the
more enabling is a corporate law, the greater is the need for institutional innovation, in
particular for new law enforcement agents.
We recognize that there may be different factors influencing the innovative capacity
of legal systems. The constitutional system, including the allocation of legislative powers
and the ease with which rulemaking powers can be delegated to other agents, e.g.,
regulators, may influence the responsiveness and innovativeness of legal systems.
Moreover, political factors may hinder or support legal reform in corporate law.
Colombia’s problems in maintaining political stability and fighting drug trade may have
prevented a more proactive stand on issues related to matters of corporate law. We do not
address these broad political and constitutional factors because they are beyond the scope
of this research project. However, we do include a country’s history in developing its
formal legal order into our analysis. Berkowitz et al. (2003) suggest that countries that
have imported their formal legal order, rather than having developed it internally may
suffer from the transplant effect. These authors show that legal transplants have weaker
legal institutions than origin countries. In explaining their findings, they suggest that the
transplant countries may lack a demand for the legal order that is superimposed on them;
therefore, their governments may decide not to invest in institutions necessary to
implement this order. Hence, we assert a fourth proposition that legal transplant countries
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reveal less innovative capacity as indicated by the rate of legal change than do legal –
origin countries.

3.

The Data and the Indicators of Innovative Capacity

We include ten countries in our analysis, of which four origin countries represent the
major legal families of common law, French civil law, and German civil law and six are
transplant countries. We select the leading countries for each legal family and add 1-3
transplant countries to each family. The selection of transplants is guided primarily by the
expertise of the authors. While we recognize the problems involved in not using more
objective criteria for sampling purposes, our research involved a large amount of legal
analysis, for which some familiarity with the legal systems appeared to be sufficiently
important to overrule those concerns.
We code legal change from the first enactment of formal corporate statutes until
the end of 2000. We note two important observations at the outset. First, the earliest
statutory laws of the four origin countries did not differ much from one another. All were
rather short and paid little attention to the internal governance structure of the
corporation, to corporate finance, or to the transfer of corporate control. They focused
primarily on the formation of the corporation, the activities it could undertake, and the
distribution of assets upon dissolution. Second, when law was transplanted, it was usually
the most up-to-date version of the corporate law. Thus, in theory, transplant countries
had the chance to bridge the gap and catch up with legal developments in origin
countries.
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Regarding the contents of corporate law, our primary focus is on changes in the
law that pertain to corporate finance, including provisions governing legal capital,
changes in corporate capital, procedures for issuing shares, preemptive rights, and
repurchase of shares. The major advantage of the publicly held corporation is that it can
raise funds from a broad base of investors. Moreover, corporate finance rules play a
crucial role in structuring mergers and takeovers, which are important features of the
market for corporate control. In parallel work, we investigate the internal governance
structure and rules on entry and exit of the firm (Pistor et al., 2002). We find that legal
systems differ most substantially in the area of corporate finance, which makes this a
fruitful area in which to analyze the scope of legal innovation.
To determine whether corporate law is mandatory or enabling, we analyze the
allocation of control rights with regards to core provisions of corporate finance in
statutory law. Table 2 contains a brief definition of the variables and indicates the type of
rule that we consider mandatory or enabling.

Table 2: Definition of Corporate Finance Indicators
Indicator
Definition
Legal capital
Minimum amount shareholders
must contribute when
establishing the corporation
Capital
increase &
decrease
Authorized,
unissued
capital
Preemptive
rights

Provisions determining who
may decide on changes in
corporate capital and what
majority requirements must be
met for valid decision
Once shareholders have
authorized the issuance of new
shares, directors may determine
when and at what price to issue
them
Right of existing shareholders to
buy newly issued shares in
proportion to their current

Mandatory
Minimum capital or
minimum par value of
shares is determined in
statutory law.

Authorized stock is not
provided for or
prohibited.

Enabling
No minimum capital
provision in statutory law
and/or corporation may
issue shares without par
value.
Majority shareholder vote
is sufficient; higher
requirements may be
stipulated in corporate
charter.
Directors may determine
the timing and pricing of
share issuances.

Newly issued shares
must be offered first to
existing shareholders.

For shareholders to have a
preemptive right, the
corporate charter must

Unanimous or
supermajority vote by
shareholders is required.

14

Repurchase of
shares

holdings
The company has the right to
buy its own stock

The company may not
buy its own stock except
in cases enumerated in
statutory law.

stipulate it explicitly.
The company may buy its
own stock subject only to
rules guarding against
capital depletion

The appendix contains the allocation of control rights over these issues for the ten
countries in our sample. These countries fall into three broad categories, namely,
countries with a highly enabling corporate law, those with a moderately enabling
corporate law, and those with a mandatory corporate law.
Delaware is the only country that fits perfectly into the first group of highly
enabling statutory corporate law. It leaves the allocation of control rights over most
finance issues to corporate stakeholders. While the first corporate statute of 1883 in
Delaware and several subsequent revisions included a number of mandatory provisions,
corporate law became increasingly more enabling. Most of these changes were
accomplished by the late 1920s. For example, statutory nor case law stipulated the
appropriate level of capital that had to be contributed at the time the company was
founded. This rather broad formulation left it up to both corporate stakeholders and courts
to determine the appropriate level of capital on a case-by-case basis. In 1929, the
supermajority requirement for changes in corporate capital was reduced to simple
majority. Thus, the legislature signaled that minority shareholders would not be able to
veto changes in corporate capital. Creditors were not protected in corporate law; rather
they had to protect themselves through contractual covenants. Measures that could affect
creditors, e.g. the redemption and retiring of shares, were left to the board to decide.
Directors also obtained the right to determine the timing of issuing authorized stock and
the pricing thereof. At the same time, shareholders’ preemptive rights were curtailed.
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Whereas in the early 19th century, courts held that preemptive rights were a fundamental
right of shareholders, the desire to use shares more flexibly as part of control transactions
or to access new markets took precedence over these more traditional concerns. Since
1927, Delaware law allows corporations to restrict preemptive rights or/and, as of 1967,
preemptive rights must be stipulated explicitly in the corporate charter or shareholders do
not possess this right.
Corporate law in England never achieved the same level of flexibility. Therefore,
we place England together with Malaysia and Israel in the group of moderately enabling
corporate law. In fact, contrary to the general trend from a more mandatory to a more
enabling corporate law that we observe in most countries in this group, England has
included provisions on minimum corporate capital and mandatory preemptive rights only
in 1980. This was in response to EU harmonization requirements and does not necessarily
reflect a shift in England’s general approach to corporate law. If we ignore these imposed
changes, English corporate law has remained remarkably stable. The law set broad limits
on the allocation of control rights, but left it up to corporate stakeholders to change them
within these limits. As a result, shareholders remain firmly in control of most decisions.
Unlike in Delaware, shares must be issued at par value and changes in corporate capital
still require a supermajority vote of 3/4. However, the corporate charter was left to
determine the conditions for repurchasing company shares and, as mentioned already,
preemptive rights did not exist in England before it joined the EU.
The two transplant countries in the common law family, Israel and Malaysia, are
relatively close to the English case. Israel received English corporate law in 1929 and the
first major revision in 1983 retained most of the characteristics of English law. However,
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the 1999 revision suggests that Israel is moving closer to the Delaware model. In
particular, the voting requirement for changes in corporate capital have been lowered to
simple majority vote and preemptive rights may be waived at the time the shareholders
vote on the issuance of new shares. Part of the territories that comprise Malaysia received
English law during the late 19th century. Similar to Israel, the consolidated terrtiroy of
Malaysia received the 1928 English Companies Act in 1929. In 1965, Malaysia revised
the law following the Australian model which is itself a copy of English law and has
revised this statute several more times. Although Malaysia has followed the Delaware
model regarding decisions on changes in corporate capital, it requires a special
shareholder vote for issuing authorized capital. Furthermore, Malaysia allows share
repurchase only for the purpose of reducing corporate capital, to buffer steep declines in
share prices, as an alternative to dividend payment, or as a defensive strategy in a
takeover contest.
The third group includes countries in which corporate law mandates the allocation
of control rights traditionally and gives corporate stakeholders very little flexibility to
reallocate them. There are signs that flexibility is increasing because the law grants more
exemptions to mandatory provisions. However, the general position that lawmakers, not
stakeholders, determine the allocation of control rights remains largely unchanged.
Germany and France, as well as the transplant countries of these legal systems, fit into
this category. In 1870, Germany liberalized the entry requirements for corporations by
moving from the concession to the registration system. This change occurred twenty-six
years after England had made this move, and three years after France had taken a similar
decision. Subsequently, Germany experienced a major founders’ boom, followed by a
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crash. The government’s response was to tighten entry requirements once more and to
protect small investors by effectively preventing them from investing in large publicly
traded corporations. The new law of 1884 mandated that the nominal value and minimum
price for each newly issued share was 1,000 Reichsmark (RM), which was well beyond
the capability of small investors to pay (Reich, 1976). In addition, the law required that
all original contributions be fully paid up before the corporation was registered.
In the next major revision of Germany’s corporate law in 1937, legal capital was
introduced and any change in corporate capital required a three-quarter majority. The
1937 revision also introduced authorized but unissued, capital, but, the board could
exercise the right to issue this type of stock only for a period of up to 5 years. Stock
repurchase by the corporation was prohibited in 1870; in 1884, it was allowed only for
the purpose of decreasing corporate capital. In 1937, the prohibition to repurchase stock
was relaxed so that the corporation could repurchase up to 10 percent of its corporate
capital, but only for purposes enumerated in the law. In 1965, the list of exemptions from
the prohibition to repurchases was extended to include employee stock plans and
repurchases for raising cash funds to buy out shareholders with put options. Since 1998,
management stock option plans are also exempted. To prevent misuse of this new
flexibility, the law stipulates that repurchasing shares is not allowed for the sole purpose
of trading in the company’s own shares.
Preemptive rights became mandatory in Germany in 1897. Shareholders are in
principle allowed to waive them at the shareholder meeting during which the capital
increase is decided. However, case law established that such a decision is valid only, if
the allocation of these shares can be specified sufficiently at the time so that shareholders
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can weigh their options.5 For cases in which the purpose of the new issuance was to place
shares on international markets or to use them as currency for future merger, i.e.,
transactions that are highly contingent on a number of conditions that are difficult to
specify ex ante, this requirement proved difficult to satisfy. The German Supreme Court
upheld this line of reasoning until the 1990s, when the first signs of a change in opinion
appeared in a case involving Deutsche Bank.6 Finally, the court put aside the
specification requirement in 1997 and accepted a waiver of preemptive rights on the
grounds that the shares could be used for future control transactions.7 This decision came
over seventy years after Delaware enacted an amendment giving shareholders the right to
restrict preemptive rights in the corporate charter.
The development in France parallels that in Germany. The relaxation of statutory
provisions has often been accompanied by conditions that limit the newly gained
flexibility. For example, although directors have the right to issue authorized stock,
shareholders have to approve any change in the price at which stock is issued. Similarly,
it has been possible to waive preemptive rights since 1950, but only for specific purposes.
Recently, this conditionality has been loosened by allowing directors to issue shares
within two years after authorization without a specific purpose. However, changes in
price still require shareholder approval.
Japan is also closer to the German model than to the Delaware one, despite having
a U.S. style corporate law on the books since 1950 (West, 2001). Minimum capital
requirements were introduced only recently. Shares repurchase remains restricted, even
5

German Supreme Court (BGH) of 13 August 1978, published in Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW)
1978, pp. 1316 (Kali-Salz). See also the Holzmann decision, German Supreme Court (BGH) of 19 April
published in NJW 1982, pp. 2444.
6
German Supreme Court (BGH) of 7 March 1994, published in NJW 1994, pp 1410 (Deutsche Bank).
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though the list of exemptions has increased. The only issue on which the law is more
flexible than the German law is preemptive rights. Directors may stipulate preemptive
rights with each new share issue. Spain also fits into the third group of countries. This
classification may be due to a path dependent legal development because Spain borrowed
extensively from France in the nineteenth century. In addition, Chilean law falls into this
category. Although revisions in 1981 and subsequent years were influenced strongly by
US law, Chilean law remains to this day much more mandatory than the laws of
Delaware or other common law jurisdictions in our sample. Thus, changes in corporate
capital still require supermajority vote and unissued authorized stock is not provided by
law! Furthermore, preemptive rights are mandatory and the repurchase of shares remains
prohibited. Earlier law in Chile and Colombian law was even more restrictive in that it
allocated a number of important control rights explicitly to government agents rather than
to corporate stakeholders. In 1854, Chilean law required two separate presidential decrees
for establishing a corporation and any decrease in corporate capital was subject to
government approval. Moreover, the registering authority stipulated the amount of legal
capital at the time of incorporation. State control rights have been equally common in
Colombia since that country copied Chilean law in 1887; many of these statutes are still
on the books today.
This brief overview suggests that the sample consists of two outliers, namely,
Delaware on the flexible end of the spectrum and Colombia on the restrictive side. The
remaining eight countries fit somewhere in the middle. England and English transplant
countries are somewhat closer to Delaware. Although Japan received U.S. – style
corporate law in 1950, albeit from Illinois and not from Delaware as West (2001a)
7

BGH, 23. 6. 1997 – II ZR 132/93, published in NJW 2997 (42) pp. 2815.

20

asserts, the country has remained more faithful to the civil law tradition from which it
original borrowed its institutions.
The rate of legal change is a simple measure of the frequency of statutory legal
change over the course of a law’s lifetime. To compute the rate of legal change, we
include all major statutory changes, not only those that address corporate finance issues.
Major legal change is defined as a substantive change of legal provisions, beyond
editorial changes or changes to ensure consistency with other legal reform projects.
While judgment is required, we find little dispute in secondary sources in any of the
countries over the dates when important changes in, or revisions of, corporate law
occurred. Table 3 documents the dates of major legal changes in corporate law in the ten
countries.
Table 3: Legal Changes in Statutory Corporate Law
France Germany UK US
French Tr.
Germ.Tr.
English Tr.
Del. Spain Chile Colombia Japan Israel Malaysia
1807
1861
1844 1883 1829 1854
1853
1899
1929
1929
1856
1870
1862 1899 1848 1865
1887
1938
1968
1965
1867
1884
1867 1901 1868 1878
1888
1950
1983
1972
1907
1897
1877 1917 1869 1924
1898
1952
1986
1983
1931
1931
1879 1927 1885 1929
1931
1955
1999
1985
1935
1937
1880 1929 1919 1931
1950
1966
1987
1937
1965
1890 1931 1942 1947
1971
1969
1993
1943
1969
1892 1935 1947 1970
1971
1953
1976
1909 1937 1951 1981
1974
1966
1978
1929 1943 1988 1987
1981
1978
1982
1948 1949 1989 1994
1988
1981
1994
1967 1957 1994
1990
1984
1998
1972 1967 1995
1992
1989
1980 1988 1998
1993
1994
1985
1994
1999
1986
1997
1987
1999
1989
1993
Note: Tr stands for transplant.
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This measure of the rate of change does not capture the contents of change so that it is
not a direct measure of legal innovation, because legal change may re-enforce the status
quo or even indicate regress rather than progress. For example, Colombia allowed
companies to incorporate freely in 1853, but required state approval in the 1887 law.
Nevertheless, statutory legal change may be taken as a rough proxy of the
responsiveness of statutory law to observed or perceived problems. The lack of statutory
change may indicate that the original law works perfectly well and does not require
adjustments. In an ideal world, laws should be fairly stable over time in order to ensure
calculability of a legal system (Weber, 1981). Each legal change requires adjustment in
corporate statutes or business strategies so that it imposes a cost. Furthermore, a stable
law is a better platform for long-term planning. However, there is much need for legal
change in the real world, because lawmakers can not foresee all future contingencies.
Therefore, they must write incomplete law as Pistor and Xu (2003) and Xu and Pistor
(2002) assert. Once gaps in the law become apparent, lawmakers may want to fill them
by writing new law or by reallocating lawmaking and law enforcement powers to agents
who are capable of responding more flexibly to such changes.
Table 4 lists the rate of change in corporate law as measured by the average number
of years between each major legal change from the first enactment of corporate statutes
in a given country to 2000.

Table 4: Rate of Statutory Change in Corporate Law
Countries
Chile
Colombia
France

Ratio of Change
14.6
24.5
12.9

22

Germany
Israel
Japan
Malaysia
Spain
UK
US
Sample Mean
Source: Compilation by authors.

11.6
17.8
6.3
10.1
13.2
8.7
9
12.9

For the whole sample, corporate statutes are changed every 12.9 years on average.
Table 5 presents the means for the various classifications of countries, namely, the major
legal families, for origin versus transplant countries, and mandatory versus enabling
corporate law.

Table 5: Comparison of Means
Legal Family
Common Law
Source of Law
Nature of Corporate
Law

11.4
Legal Origins
10.5
Highly Enabling
9

German & French
Civil Law
12.61
Legal Transplants
14.4
Moderately enabling
12.2

Mandatory
13.8

As Table 5 indicates, there is little difference across legal families but substantial
differences both between legal origin countries and legal transplant countries, and
between highly enabling and less enabling or mandatory legal systems.
Comparing transplant and origin countries, origin countries change their corporate
statutes every 10.5 years, on average, while transplants take over fifteen years to make
these changes. Delaware, which has the most enabling corporate law, changes its
corporate statute every 9 years on average. However, this calculation understates actual
legal change in Delaware, because the law is changed on an incremental basis almost
every year. We do not capture these smaller changes because we include only major
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change as defined above. Nonetheless, a series of smaller changes obviously necessitates
fewer major ones. By comparison, the rate of change for the moderately enabling or
mandatory legal systems is around 12 years, on average. Given the small sample size and
the substantial variance across countries in different categories, generalization of these
findings must be treated cautiously. Nonetheless, our evidence suggests that there are
fewer differences in the innovative capacity for different legal families, i.e., common law
versus civil law, than for transplant versus origin countries or for enabling versus
mandatory legal systems.
A major challenge faced by enabling legal systems is the settlement of disputes over
competing claims for control rights. For mandatory legal systems, this is less of a
problem because the law itself clearly allocates control rights and does not leave much
room for their reallocation. Therefore, it is sufficient to have courts enforce or reinforce
the mandated allocation. In fact, many countries with mandatory corporate laws restrict
judicial recourse in matters that are regarded as organizational disputes and should be
resolved among the relevant stakeholders. By contrast, enabling corporate laws allow
stakeholders to reallocate control rights, making the system more prone to open dispute.
Moreover, enabling corporate legal systems also give directors and officers more
flexibility in deciding major business strategies without direct involvement by
shareholders. Although some authors argue that market forces are the best control
mechanisms against abuse of these powers, e.g., Easterbrook and Fischel (1991) and
Romano (1993), others are more skeptical and point to need of active law enforcement,
e.g. Bebchuk (1989) and Coffee (1989). From the latter perspective, an enabling legal
system is more dependent on effective enforcement institutions than are mandatory legal
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systems. In fact, as Professor Coffee has argued before, the increasingly more enabling
corporate law of Delaware has increased the demands on the judiciary to determine the
boundaries of the flexible statutory law. In fact, he considers the judge-made law on
fiduciary duties to be corporate law’s most mandatory core.
Courts are not the only enforcement institutions governing the corporate enterprise.
Financial market regulators have emerged over time to address the failure of traditional
law enforcement institutions. At first, these regulators emerged as self-regulators and,
overtime, the stock exchanges gradually assumed regulatory functions over the
companies wishing to list on their exchanges. The New York Stock Exchange
established listing requirements for firms as early as the middle of the 19th century
(Michie, 1987). The London Stock Exchange followed suit more slowly and somewhat
reluctantly, but it eventually gave in to market and government pressures (Coffee, 2002a
and Michie, 1999). Notably, these leading stock exchanges were established in countries
that we characterize as highly enabling and moderately enabling, respectively. By
contrast, France placed the bourse under state control after suffering a major market crash
in the early 18th century (Hopt, Rudolph, and Baum, 1997). Similarly, Germany
responded to the founders’ boom and crash in the late 19th century with strict regulation
of the stock exchange, which virtually stifled market development (Merkt, 1997). In both
countries, the regulatory approach mirrored that of the legislation governing corporations
and mandatory state controls triumphed over experimentation. To be sure, mandatory
rules became the hallmark of U.S. – style securities regulation, which was enacted in
1933 and 1934 in response to the 1929 stock market crash. However, the emphases of
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U.S. mandatory rules are on disclosure, which is less restrictive for experimentation and
innovation than are mandatory rule that govern the substance of corporate affairs.
The evolution of enforcement institutions in transplant countries is more difficult to
trace. The transplantation of legal systems typically entails copying both laws on court
organization and procedural rules. In addition, transplant countries often copy securities
regulations from their respective origin countries in the hope of jumpstarting financial
market development. However, empirical evidence suggests that legal institutions in
transplant countries are mainly less effective than are their equivalents in origin countries
even after controlling for GDP (Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard, 2003). Hence, transplant
countries may have been less successful in institutional innovation designed to address
problems of law enforcement.

4. Conclusion
Our evidence suggests that there are indeed substantial differences in the propensities
of legal systems to innovate. We find the greatest divergence between origin and
transplant countries, on the one hand, and highly enabling and all other systems, on the
other. In contrast, we find little evidence that the civil versus common law divide
provides strong explanations for differences in legal innovation. The last result is
somewhat puzzling because common law countries tend to be more enabling than civil
law countries. However, not all common law countries have used the potential advantage
of the information that is revealed by the process of active litigation. Unfortunately,
litigation data are difficult to collect so that testing the proposition that the rate of
litigation is the main determinant of the rate of statutory legal change is infeasible. We
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also find that countries with more enabling corporate laws are the leaders in developing
new types of lawmaking and law enforcement institutions, such as regulators. In fact, the
future of these systems probably depends on the invention of such mechanisms to address
the risks that are present in a more enabling approach to corporate law.
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Appendix: Changes in legal provisions on corporate finance
Note: X denotes no change to previous column. (-) indicates that the relevant provision does not
exist in the statutory law of that country.
Delaware
Legal Capital
Capital Decrease

1900
Nominal value
stipulated in corporate
charter
2/3 Shareholder vote

Capital Increase

2/3 Shareholder vote

Issue of authorized
stock
Preemptive Rights

(-)

Share Repurchase

Repurchase implied

UK
Legal Capital

1900
Nominal value
stipulated in corporate
charter; no issue
below par
¾ Shareholder vote
¾ Shareholder vote
Directors may issue
authorized stock.
(-)

Capital Decrease
Capital Increase
Issuing authorized
stock
Preemptive Rights
Share Repurchase

(-)

Corporate charter
determines conditions.

1950
Shares may be issued
without par value

2000
X

Shareholder majority
vote

Directors may retire
unissued or
repurchased stock
X

Shareholder majority
vote; directors may
decide to set aside net
assets.
Directors may issue
authorized stock
Corporate charter may
restrict preemptive
rights.
Repurchase by
directors’ decision;
guidelines for prices

X
Preemptive rights
only if stipulated in
corporate charter
X

1950
X

2000
Minimum capital
requirement

X
X
X

X
X
X

X

Preemptive rights may
be waived.
X

X
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FRANCE
Legal Capital
Capital Decrease
Capital Increase
Issuing authorized
stock

1900
Minimum share value
stipulated by law; no
issue below par.
Board resolution and
2/3 shareholder vote
Board resolution and
2/3 shareholder vote
No

1950
X

2000
X

X

X

X

X

No

Board may issue
authorized stock;
price adjustment must
be approved by
shareholders.
Preemptive rights may
be waived without
specifying placement
for 2 years;
shareholders must
approve changes in
price.
Special prospectus
and clearance from
regulator required.

Preemptive Rights

(-)

Shareholders have
preemptive rights that
may be waived for
placement with
specified investor.

Share Repurchase

No

No

GERMANY
Legal Capital

1900
Nominal share value
stated in law; no
issuance below par
¾ Shareholder vote
¾ Shareholder vote;
increase only after
original contributions
fully paid in
No

1950
X
Minimum capital
requirement
X
X

Preemptive Rights

Preemptive rights
granted by law; may
be waved

Share Repurchase

Only in context of
formal capital
reduction and if
provided in charter

X
¾ shareholder vote to
waive preemptive
rights
X

Capital Decrease
Capital Increase

Issuing authorized
stock

Directors may issue
authorized shares
within 5 years.

2000
X
X
X
X

X
¾ of capital must be
present at the
shareholder meeting
that authorizes capital
X

Shareholders may
authorize repurchase a
maximum of 10% of
total stock for 18
months.
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Israel
Capital Decrease

1950
Nominal share value stated in
corporate charter
¾ majority shareholders vote

Capital Increase

¾ majority shareholders vote

Issuing authorized stock
Preemptive Rights

(-)
(-)

Share Repurchase

No repurchase

Legal Capital

Malaysia
Capital Decrease

1950
Nominal share value stated in
corporate charter
¾ shareholder vote

Capital Increase

¾ shareholder vote

Issuing authorized stock
Preemptive Rights
Share Repurchase

Not addresses
(-)
Prohibited

Legal Capital

2000
X
Simple majority shareholder
vote
Simple majority shareholder
vote
(-)
Preemptive rights may be
waived.
Repurchase allowed under
conditions stipulated in law.

2000
X
Simple majority shareholder
vote
Simple majority shareholder
vote
Shareholder vote required
X
Permitted to reduce capital
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JAPAN
Legal Capital

1900
Minimum par value
stipulated in law

1950
X

Capital Decrease

Simple majority vote

Capital Increase

Simple majority vote

Issuing authorized
stock
Preemptive Rights

(-)

Share Repurchase

Prohibited

X
(quorum raised from
50% to 2/3)
X
(quorum raised from
50% to 2/3)
Directors may issue
authorized stock
Available, if
stipulated in corporate
charter
Prohibited with
exception of share
amortization, merger,
enforcement of rights,
and payment of
appraisal rights to
dissenters

SPAIN
Legal Capital

1900
Registering authority
assesses adequacy.

1950
X

2000
Minimum capital
stated in law

Capital Decrease

Unanimous decision

X

Capital Increase

Unanimous decision

Issuing authorized
stock
Preemptive Rights

(-)

X
(2/3 at second
meeting)
X
(2/3 at second
meeting)
X

(-)

Preemptive rights
established

Share Repurchase

Prohibited

X

(-)

2000
X
Minimum capital
requirements
X
X
X
Board may stipulate
right with each new
issuance
X; exception extended
to employee and
management stock
option for up to 10%
of corporate capital if
exercised within 10
years

X
X
Preemptive rights may
be waived by supermajority vote.
Exemptions apply to
employee and
management stock
option plans.
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CHILE
Legal Capital

1900
Minimum capital
fixed by government

1950
Minimum capital
stipulated in law

2000
Minimum capital
must be adequate for
operation.
2/3 majority
shareholder vote
2/3 majority
shareholder vote
(-)

Capital Decrease

Prohibited

Capital Increase

Unanimous vote

Subject to approval by
government
X

Issuing authorized
stock
Preemptive Rights

(-)

(-)

(-)

X

Share Repurchase

Prohibited

X

Preemptive rights
granted by law
X

COLOMBIA
Legal Capital

1950
X

2000
X

Capital Decrease

1900
Minimum capital
fixed by government
Prohibited

X

Capital Increase

Unanimous vote

X and government
approval

Issuing authorized
stock
Preemptive Rights

(-)

X

70% majority
shareholder vote and
government approval
70% majority
shareholder vote and
government approval
X

(-)

Preemptive rights
granted by law

Share Repurchase

Prohibited

X

X; exclusion only
with government
approval
X
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